The Rise of Islamic Political Movements in the MENA

Introduction:

When we look to the Middle East and Arab world today, it's clear that the region is in a time of fluid change and uncertainty. Much of the change and layers of complexity we see stem from Islamists and political Islam throughout the region. Islamists have stepped in and taken on roles previously reserved for others, and it's these new and massive Islamist movements that are shifting and reshaping the MENA region in the twenty-first century. Islamists have woven themselves deep into the very fabric and foundation of social society, and they understand how to organize, rally, and mobilize support (Brown et al. 2006, 5). As Brown et al. explain, "Their ideology prescribes a simple solution to the persistent crisis of contemporary Arab societies–a return to the fundamentals, or true spirit, of Islam" (Ibid.). 

When looking at Islamist movements, it is important to understand that they are built upon the idea of spreading practices and belief sets as a religious organization and should not be viewed solely as that of a political actor. We can see this foundation more clearly in those states or movements where the creation of Islamic political parties is forbidden. They are therefore left with no alternatives outside of merging religious and political aspirations under one organizational umbrella. Further, it is essential to recognize that these movements all seek to apply Islamic sharia, and without the implementation of sharia, they would not be classified as an Islamic movement (Ibid. 7-8). But which movements have brought about the most critical change and hold the most influential power across the Middle East? These are the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring of 2011, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Iranian Revolution:

Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been facing off in fierce competition since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Iran's revolution changed the course of history and the political landscape in the global arena. It continues to influence the Middle East and global alliances to the present day. It was the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, a monarch and secular authoritarian, that the clerical regime began to cement its power and influence. That birthed the Supreme Leader bestowing upon him ultimate power and authority in both religious and political spheres of influence (Katzman 2018, 2). Power dynamics were thus threatened in the region, as the monarchy was ripped of its crown, and the Supreme Leader stepped in with a new strategy to gain the upper hand in the broader Muslim arena. 

The Iranian model largely paints its legitimacy around how it executes Islamic principles and via the Supreme Leader's authority. In this hierarchy, the people fall to the power, authority, and whims of the Supreme Leader and clergy (the clergy also being monitored and controlled by the Supreme Leader). Any appearance of choice in candidacy is largely an illusion, as all options are vetted and pre-approved by the Guardian Council. Cementing the power hierarchy is the constitution, granting unlimited power and control to the Supreme Leader (Noi n.d., 93). Further, Iran's model stems from Shia Islam, specifically the Jafari School of Islamic Jurisprudence, also known as Twelvers. The premise behind their school of thought is the bloodline to Ali and an acceptance of twelve infallible imams, the last believed to be in hiding, chosen by Muhammad at the wishes of Allah. These imams are deemed persons of faith and the interpreters of the law. Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian religious leader, became Iran's first Supreme Leader (Blanchard 2005, 5). Through this Shia-Jafari worldview, Iran hopes to create "a new, Islam-centric order in the Middle East" (Noi n.d. 94).

Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia:

Post-revolution Iran poses a threat to Saudi Arabia for several reasons. If Iran's monarchy could be removed by way of revolution, could a similar revolution within the borders of Saudi Arabia destabilize the Saud family? These fears further tighten their resolve to avoid or crush any popular uprisings and strengthen their primary objective–to stay in power. The fall of the Shah and the rise of the Khomeini-style government served as a warning of caution to the Saud regime. It also birthed a Shia competitor, vying for power and influence across the Muslim world. Even more, it deepened the divide throughout the region between pro-West and anti-West forces, altering alliances in the process. Saudi Arabia leads the pro-Western side in partnership with the United States and Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States. Iran leads the resistance camp, working against the West and Qatar, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Syria (Noi n.d. 92). This battle for power has the potential to influence and sculpt the future Middle East significantly. Further, Saudi Arabia is home to Medina and Mecca, adding to their "geostrategic, geo-cultural, and most importantly, geo-economic characteristics…" (Ataman 2012, 3). That puts them in a position of critical significance in the Middle East and Arab world and also makes them a target of competition. Saudi Arabia is ruled by the Saud family monarchy, combined with a super-conservative version of Islam and sharia implementation–that of Wahhabism. 

In Sunni Islam, there are four schools of thought: Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali. Past these, there exists a variety of other Islamic schools of thought, often labeled as illegitimate. It is in this sphere that we find Wahhabism. This school of thought is often deemed an extreme version of Sunni Islam. Further, any protest against the ruling regime is labeled sinful under Wahhabi doctrine (Noi n.d. 94). The Saudi monarchy seeks to position itself as the leader of the Islamic world. That puts the ruling monarchy in a similar vein to that of Iran's Supreme Leader regarding aspirations of power and authority. The Wahhabi seek to restore older Islamic practices and place the authority to interpret scripture with the line of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab. Wahhabis believe the followers of other schools of thought, even those within Sunni Islam, to have veered off course (Ibid.). Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia is directly interlaced with the ruling monarchy and is deeply woven throughout the very fabric of the kingdom. This lens shapes the way they see and interact with the Middle East and the larger global arena. 

The Arab Spring:

The Arab Spring captured the world's attention in 2011. The massive uprisings left in their wake new power struggles and resculpted the political arena across the MENA. The protests and overthrow of Mubarak in Cairo worked to deepen the Saudi Arabia – Iran rivalry further. Iran positioned itself in favor of the overthrow, and Saudi Arabia, fearing spillover into its throne of power, stood against it. Additionally, Iran's support in Egypt established a rekindling of alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood, who took over power post-Mubarak as the newly-elected government. Subsequently, as Noi goes on to explain, "Cairo began to distance itself from Saudi Arabia due to the kingdom's counterrevolutionary and pro-Mubarak stance" (n.d., 102). That was an interesting development and strategy on Shia-based Iran's part in creating an alliance with Sunni-based Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Egypt is predominately Sunni, which, as mentioned previously, is broken up into four primary schools of thought. Sunnis differ from Shia in that they don't interpret the Quran themselves but rather submit to previous interpretations. Shafi'i is the dominant school of thought in Egypt, although there are also mentionable numbers of Maliki followers, particularly in Upper Egypt. Shafi'i argued that "absolute certain knowledge of God's divine law comes exclusively from the divine revelations given to Muhammad directly by God," which are told in the Quran and outside of which, dictums and prescriptions from the Prophet are the only other source of legitimate law ("A Concise Summary…" n.d., 4). Further, due to the Prophet's infallibility, he alone could serve as an uncontested deriver of law in circumstances not made clear in the Quran (Ibid.).

The root and expansion of Islamist presence in civil society in Egypt stem from economic reform in the 1970s under Sadat, which continued under Mubarak. The primary goal was to strategically remove the government from providing essential services and being a critical source of guaranteed job placement programs. That would set the stage for the protests that were to come, as devastating unemployment in the 80s-90s ensued. As a result, increased costs of electricity, bread, and housing; delayed marriages; and a deepened gap between rich and poor created an immense crisis in need of a protagonist. (Mandaville 2014, 108-109). 

The Muslim Brotherhood:

It was then that great opportunity arose for an Islamic sector to step in and fill the gap where the government had fallen short. During this time, the Muslim Brotherhood harnessed its true strength, buying the public's trust and support through the creation of privately funded Islamic social service organizations. The disparity created by soaring costs, unemployment, and a seemingly uninterested government was a driving force in the Arab Spring Egyptian revolution that toppled Mubarak and opened a political door to the Muslim Brotherhood. Before the revolution, "political Islam was never a viable alternative to the authoritarian regime, with a real possibility of gaining power through elections" but in the wake of a successful regime overthrow, "the preparations to determine the future of the Egyptian system began, political Islam could aspire to lead the state" (Mustafa 2013, 146). While the Muslim Brotherhood gained much political power in the aftermath of Mubarak's fall, it was not to last long.

In 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood was removed from power in a coup d’état, led by army general Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Once Morsi was removed from the presidency, five potential futures remained for the Muslim Brotherhood:

• The regime could eradicate them.

• Protests might pull enough popular support to remove the regime and return the Brotherhood to the political sphere.

• They might be granted limited inclusion through negotiations.

• They could split into moderate and hardliner positions internally.

• They could withdrawal altogether.

Regardless, the current dynamics do not build a stable foundation for a future democratic Egypt (El-Sherif 2014, 1-2). As El-Sherif further explains, "Any path for democratic political and social change has not been welcomed by the old state or the Islamists, who remain unwilling to engage with other actors or to foster renewed democratic thinking. That leaves political Islam, like the old state in Egypt, part of the ongoing problem rather than the solution" (Ibid.).

Conclusion:

Islamism in the MENA has become a political force to reckon with. In this new political atmosphere, "sectarian differences have become powerful instruments that have the capacity to alter regional alignments and shape the relations that states have with one another" (Noi n.d., 106-7). The future of the Middle East and Islam's political influence is uncertain, unstable, and highly complex.

References:

“A Concise Summary of the Evolution of Islamic Law (Shar'ia) From its Inception to the Present.” n.d. http://www.upenn.edu/emeritus/events/IslamicLaw.pdf. (Accessed 29 Oct. 2018). 

Ataman, Muhittin. 2012. "Turkey and Saudi Arabia:Newly Discovered Partners?" Foundation for Political, Economical, and Social Research 57(July 2012):1-23.

Blanchard, Christopher M. 2005. Islam: Sunnis and Shiites. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service Report. 

Brown, Nathan J. Amr Hamzawy, and Marina Ottaway. Islamist Movements and the Democratic Process in the Arab World:Exploring the Gray Zones 67 (March 2006): 5-17.

El-Sherif, Ashraf. "The Muslim Brotherhood and the Future of Political Islam in Egypt." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (October 2014): 1-29.

Katzman, Kenneth. n.d. “Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies,” 68.

Mandaville, Peter. 2007. Global Political Islam.London, U.S.: Routledge.

Mustafa, Mohanad, and Ayman Talal Yousef. 2013. The Interaction of Political Islam with Democracy: The Political Platform of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a Case Study," International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3 no. 11: 144-154. 

Noi Aylin Unver. "A Clash of Islamic Models." Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 15: 92-107.