The Birth of a New Iran

Introduction:

A quick study of modern-day Iranian politics reveals without a doubt that their political nature is a vastly different one from the days of the Shah and pre-revolution past. The pacifist-natured political involvement of Islam in Iran is history, replaced by an overly-active stance and a country fell prey to the whims of a Supreme Leader. But how did this come to pass, and what are the roots of the Islamist school of thought that we see in today's Iran?

School of Jurisprudence:

The Iranian regime sees the world through a Shia lens, and more specifically, through the Jafari school of Islamic Jurisprudence. This worldview works to sculpt the foundation upon which their laws and foreign policy are based. The Jafari (also known as the "Twelvers") are named after Jafar al-Sadiq and carry the torch as the primary school of thought among Shi'a. ("Shi'a Islam - ReligionFacts" 2016). 

Twelvers are most saturated throughout Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq, and Iran. The premise behind this school of thought is an acceptance of twelve imams (the twelfth being hidden), with a bloodline connection to Ali. Further, these imams are believed infallible and chosen by Allah through Muhammad. They are the interpreters of law and persons of faith. Post-disappearance of the twelfth imam prompted a shift in tides, a quieting of political involvement with a "pacifist" stance. But the twentieth century brought new tides of political change across the Middle East, not least of which was a renewed "activist" shift in the political landscape, particularly in Iran. At the forefront was Ayatollah Khomeini, an Iranian religious leader (Blanchard 2005, 5).

The 1979 Revolution:

Iran's revolution of 1979 changed the course of history, not only for Iran and its citizens but also the political landscape in the global arena. It continues to influence Iran's foreign policy to the present day. It was the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, a secular authoritarian, that the clerical regime tightened its hold. That is when the "Supreme Leader" was given ultimate power and authority in religious and political realms (Katzman 2018, 2). Ayatollah Khomeini stepped onto the stage. 

The Supreme Leader:

After assuming the position as Iran's supreme leader, Khomeini understood the challenges faced in running the country solely by implementing sharia. It was in 1988 that he brought to the forefront ideas of expediency (maslaha), meaning that "if Islamic or national law contradicts the interests of the regime, the ruling jurist has the religious authority to overrule Islamic law or the constitution" (Khalaji 2011, 135). This principle became a primary characteristic in a redesigned Iranian government, no longer built around sharia or Islamic doctrine but left to the whims and mercy of the ruling jurist (Ibid.). Ayatollah Khomeinisculpted a new system that allowed clerics to be monitored and controlled by the state in their public, private, and political lives. (Ibid. 140). Further, this Supreme Leader holds the final say and power in all decisions related to foreign policy. 

The state's ability to monitor and control the public, private and political lives of clerics was a newly gained and exercised power post-revolution. In pre-revolution Iran, clerics were limited to performing ceremonies, religious rituals, and teaching in seminaries. But with the revolution and the Supreme Leader, their roles were expanded to political, military, educational, media, broadcast, art, and cultural realms. (Ibid. 136-137). But significantly expanded cleric roles weren't the end of it. Post-revolutionary Iran created a clerical establishment entirely dependent on the state government and the Supreme Leader. As Khalaji explained, "Iran's supreme leader today is not only the chief of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, but he is also the de facto head of the seminary, which has become a more centralized and rationalized institution under his tenure" (2011, 139). Further, modern technology and a digitized world have transformed the state's ability to track and monitor the seminary and the clerics' every move. The Iranian regime also employs additional tools to coerce and repress dissent among the clerics, including a new system of control through the Imam Jafar Sadiq 83 Independent Brigade (a guerrilla-cleric staffed militia that reports to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard) and the Special Court for the Clergy (Ibid. 140-141). So how does this newly sculpted Iran influence its foreign policy and its choice of allies and adversaries?

Foreign Policy and Adversaries:

The creation of an Iranian Supreme Leader brought a desire for expanded regional power and an attempt to spread the revolution across surrounding Muslim states. While they eventually abandoned the strategy, new revival opportunities arose in 2011 with the Arab Spring and its aftermath. One approach was to brand economic and political structures across the Middle East as distorted and weighted to the advantage of the United States and its allies and against the well-being of the "oppressed," meaning the Palestinians, underrepresented Shiite Muslims, and other disadvantaged minorities. Further, Iran claims its ideology as nonsectarian and pan-Islamic, citing support for Hamas and other non-Shiite and secular Palestinian groups (Katzman 2018, 2). Iranian foreign policy overall reflects a variety of approaches depending on the interest group. Katzman highlights that President Hassan Rouhani, a more moderate leader, advocates that Iran should steer clear of "permanent enemies" and maintain a pragmatic foreign policy to ease international sanctions and better market Iran as "a trade and transportation hub" (2018, 3). Public opinion on economic issues and living standards also matter and will work to impact Iran's future foreign policy, as demonstrated with the late-2017, early-2018 public protests (Ibid.).

Aside from Iran-U.S. relations, other state relationships of note are Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Iraq and Iran are comprised of majority Shia populations in an otherwise Sunni majority region of the world. In this relationship, important figures of note are Iran's current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Ayatollah Ali Hussein al-Sistani, in Iraq. As Supreme Leader, Khamenei believes himself to be the "Leader of the Islamic World." He follows Ayatollah Khomeini's footsteps, who birthed the new Iran with merged religious and political authority. Although Khamenei hopes to gain political and religious influence in Iraq, thereby expanding his control over the broader Muslim world, Sistani has the greater following. 

But Sistani has made clear he wants no part in politics. He remains affixed primarily to religious matters. As Khalaji explained, Sistani will intervene to ensure the survival of the Islamic legal foundation and serve as a "center of gravity" in Iraq's Shiite community, without enforcing or advocating for Iranian-style involvement or governmental structure (2006, 18). Khalaji goes on to say, "Yet, it is unclear to what extent and how long he can play these roles effectively in the face of ever-increasing Iranian influence. The policies of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei are fundamentally shifting Shiite politics" (Ibid.).

There is also a long history of mutual suspicion between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Further fueling the fires of mistrust and competition are sectarian differences stemming from the differing ideologies between the primary two Islamic sects. It was after Iran's 1979 revolution and the new religious and political structures birthed from it that "both states gained legitimacy through religious posturing, often at the expense of the other, reflecting a zero-sum game in operation" (Mabon 2013, 43-44) and the rivalry spun to new heights. Being home to two important Islamic holy sites, Saudi Arabia was a natural target for the Supreme Leader. Further, in the minds of Saudi officials, a strengthened Iran invites fear of weakened regime legitimacy and new spheres of influence across the Middle East. This fear works to drive much of Saudi Arabia's policies and continued anti-Iranian rhetoric (Ataman 2012, 10). In addition, the Saudi's share the concern of the U.S. in the potential of a nuclear Iran, an influencing concern in their strategies and choice of allies.

Conclusion:

It is clear that the revolution of 1979 and the Jafari school of Islamic Jurisprudence heavily color the political, social, and societal face of Iran that we see today. Ayatollah Khomeini birthed a new state structure that altered the very fabric and how the political and religious are woven together. This revolutionary change continues to impact global foreign policy dynamics today. 

References:

Ataman, Muhittin. 2012. Turkey and Saudi Arabia:Newly Discovered Partners?Foundation for Political, Economical, and Social Research 57(July 2012):1-23.

Blanchard, Christopher M. 2005. Islam: Sunnis and Shiites. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service Report. 

Katzman, Kenneth. 2018. Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, 68.

Khalaji, Mehdi. 2011. Iran's Regime of Religion.Journal of International Affairs 65, no 1.

Khalaji, Mehdi. 2006. The Last Marja. Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious

Authority in Shiism. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Focus #59. 

Mabon, Simon. 2013. Saudi Arabia and Iran. London, US: I.B.Tauris. ProQuest ebrary. Web. Chapter 2, Arabian Gulf versus Persian Gulf, pages 41-71.

“Shi’a Islam - ReligionFacts.” 2016. Accessed October 15, 2018. http://www.religionfacts.com/shia.