The Rational Actor Model of Analysis Applied to Kennedy’s Actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis

Introduction and Background

Foreign policy decisions are often analyzed, scrutinized, and debated––and for a good reason. There is substantial potential for aggression and escalation as a result of a state's defensive measures. When it comes to an arms race, it can create a vicious cycle that Dobson calls "a matrix of problems" and "the traditional security dilemma" (2006, 3). The Cuban Missile Crisis is no different. Among the variety of conceptual models of analysis, the Rational Actor Model shows how different (and devastating) this crisis might have turned out when applied to President Kennedy's actions in the face of Soviet missile placement in Cuba.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a critical moment in the history of man. It occurred over a nearly two-week period in the Fall of 1962 and consisted of many highly influential and important actions. Allison and Zelikow (1999) detailed in, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, a series of critical actions during the crisis. Secret Soviet missiles were strategically moved to Cuba, and aerial photographs were obtained by the Americans. President Kennedy reacted and confronted the Soviets on behalf of the U.S. with specific demands. Khrushchev countered U.S. demands with threats of retaliation but stopped short of crossing the established red line. President Kennedy then received private correspondence from Khrushchev detailing a potential compromise. It ended in agreement with some stipulations and on the border of a deadline that could have ended in devastating military action.

Had any of these key occurrences differed in any way, the fate of humanity might have taken a turn toward disastrous ends, with the death of hundreds of millions of innocent people worldwide. In this light, Allison explained that because such grave outcomes can manifest as a result of decisions and actions made by national governments, it underscores the importance for students and the public to pay attention (Allison 1969, 689). It is President Kennedy's reaction and confrontation strategy that this paper will focus on.

Foreign Policy Objectives

When it comes to U.S. and Soviet foreign policy objectives during the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it's safe to say that each was looking for the advantage and upper hand. Dobson described an "ideological rift between American and Soviet values" and warned that nuclear war possibilities left no room for mistakes (2006, 14). The United States needed to show, in both action and image, that it would do whatever necessary to maintain its position and freedom from communism––having a nuclear deterrent plan was part of that (Dobson 2006, 14-15). Nuclear deterrent strategies also contributed in significant ways to "a sharply divided bipolar world" (Dobson 2006, 15). This created an easy target for the U.S. (and for the Soviets) to rally support with us versus them mentality.

Khrushchev wanted to position missiles in Cuba for strategic nuclear advantage against the U.S. But why? Allison highlighted important points for consideration: the probability of a nuclear attack can be reduced by creating a "nuclear balance," meaning that said balance will reduce the chances of an attack due to fear of retaliation and helps to curb war potential (1969, 695). In addition, Soviet weapon deployment served as a "value-maximizing means of implementing Soviet strategic objectives and military doctrine" (Allison 1969, 695). The Soviets wanted to reduce the chances of a nuclear strike against them by closing the power gap and placing a deterrent, namely by positioning themselves for a quick retaliation if needed.

Because the Soviets placed missiles in Cuba, the U.S. response can largely also be understood as a "value-maximizing escalation," in which "American nuclear superiority could be counted on to paralyze Soviet nuclear power" (Allison 1969, 696). These conditions lay the foundation for the U.S. foreign policy objectives and begin to illustrate influences in President Kennedy's decisions. It also lays the groundwork and highlights some of the Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives as well. 

What did Cuba have to gain in all this? Castro did not want to be invaded by the U.S., and much like the Soviet strategy of deterrence, having Soviet missiles in Cuba served as a measure of protection against U.S. invasion. The Kennedy Administration viewed Cuba as their "political Achilles' heel" due to upcoming Congressional elections where Cuba was labeled the most critical issue of the campaign (Allison 1969, 712). The issue at hand was discord among Senate members and the Administration over which strategy was best to subdue Castro's influence on the broader Latin American region. On the one hand, the Administration wanted to take a more oblique and positive approach, but on the other hand, Senate members saw this as too weak (Allison 1969, 712).

All of these value-maximizing actions and strategies, at their core, are indicative of both rational and intellectual behavior "motivated by conscious calculation of advantages" that is "based on an explicit and internally consistent value system" (Allison 1969, 693). While this points to the Rational Actor Model, it does not account for the full gamut of strategy, and there was most certainly influence from organizations and bureaucratic politics. That said, U.S., Soviet, and Cuban strategies were largely driven by the need to balance power and protect the interests of each, much through a realist lens viewpoint. The U.S. and Kennedy administrations tried to maintain a strong nuclear advantage while also trying to navigate challenges posed by not only the Soviets but also Castro. The Soviets wanted to create a balance, a deterrent, and shake up the United States' position of power. And Cuba wanted to protect itself from U.S. interference. 

Nuclear War Potential

The Rational Actor/Policy Model is a conceptual model that seeks to understand a given situation based on the premise that there is a unification of the government or nation to include an ultimate decision-maker that leads it. As Allison described, it attempts to "show how the nation or government could have chosen the action in question, given the strategic problem that it faced" (1969, 690). Or, to put it more simply, it looks for the rationality behind decisions made by a collective unit in governance. Applied to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the model seeks to explain the rationale behind each players' decision, in this case, the Soviet Union's choice to move the missiles into Cuba, the logic behind the U.S. response, and the motives from Cuba's perspectives (Allison 1969, 690). More specifically, it analyses an action based on existing goals and values, alternative options, potential consequences, and the "net valuation of each set of consequences" (Allison 1969, 694). The inclusion of the ultimate decision-makers’ personality traits is also an important consideration within the framework of this analysis model.

Using the Rational Actor Model as a foundation for analysis, what does it say about Kennedy's decision to launch public confrontation, demands, and warnings against the Soviets in response to their missile strategy in Cuba? Further, how did Kennedy's personality and worldview influence these decisions? Welch highlighted that the president of the United States retains an enormous amount of influence and power, regardless of more forceful or more peaceful personality characteristics (1992, 132). Existing goals and values can be seen by examining Kennedy's personality, lens, and past experiences, all of which shaped his decisions as the ultimate decision-maker representing the U.S. during the crisis. 

To illustrate how vital this lens is, imagine how different the outcome might have been if a Crusader personality had been in his place, closed off to information and challenging constraints. The decision-making process and ultimate outcome might have been disastrous if say, it was Trump rather than Kennedy, in power. This is because each handles crisis based on their own pre-existing biases, lens, and experiences. If a Crusader had led the U.S. response, they might have chosen to launch an attack or confront the Soviets with a more threatening strategy. Had they caused the Soviets public embarrassment and/or no option for a middle-ground dignified response, it would have ended differently. All would have likely escalated the situation rapidly and pushed it to disastrous ends. 

As it happened, it was Kennedy in power; he was open to information and mostly unconstrained by advisors as well as Congress (Welch 1992, 132). He pulled together a team to share expertise and knowledge, but ultimately, final decisions were in his hands. Further, as Dobson illustrated, the power lies with the president in such matters, not within the "institutional establishment" (2006, 13). In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, quick response and actions were needed, and Kennedy had a team in place to share critical information, but he had the authority to respond as he saw fit. 

What were the alternative options and their potential consequences in Kennedy's response to the photographs of Soviet missiles being moved into Cuba? Kennedy could have launched an attack. However, this would have also launched retaliation measures on the part of the Soviets. It was believed, though not known for certain, that the Soviet missiles were operational, so an American attack held a high risk of retaliatory actions and a missile launch from Cuba (Welch 1992, 138). Kennedy might also have publicly confronted Khrushchev in such a way that humiliated him, which also would have led to a more devastating escalation. Instead, he took the best path of the available options; namely, he showed American strength and resolve, but also allowed the Soviets a path of retreat, sans humiliation (Allison 1969, 696). His decision also left the Soviets with the choice: compromise or military action. 

In conclusion, apprised of the Soviet missiles en route to Cuba, Kennedy, the ultimate authority of the collective United States, assembled a team to find out more information and all possible courses of action. He used the information as a guide in his decision-making process. The Rational Actor Model shows us that his values and the goals of the U.S. sculpted this process, and by being open to incoming information from others, he was able to analyze other potential courses of action value-maximizing potential and their likely consequences. Had he instead launched an attack or publicly humiliated the Soviets, the outcome would have been devastating. Instead, he skirted disastrous escalation by finding middle ground in his strategies. Further, had a Crusader personality been in his shoes, the outcome would undoubtedly have been grave. 

While the Rational Actor Model doesn't account for influences on the part of an organizational process or bureaucratic politics, it does paint a sharp picture of the logic behind decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, incorporating the Organizational Process Model and the Bureaucratic Politics Model to this analysis would paint a more well-rounded picture of the strategies, actions, and influences at work under the surface of the crisis. Their inclusion would also bring additional light to possible courses of action and valuable lessons to consider when faced with future crises, such as North Korea.

References:

Allison, Graham. 1969. Conceptual models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. American Political Science Review 63, no. 3: 689-718.

Allison, Graham and Phillip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2ed. New York: Longman.

Dobson, Alan P. and Steve Marsh. 2006. US foreign policy: evolution, formulation, and execution. London and New York: Routledge. Chapter 1 in US Foreign Policy Since 1945.

Welch, David. 1992. The organizational process and bureaucratic politics paradigms: retrospect and prospect. International Security 17, no. 2 (Autumn): 112-146.

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