Analysis and Recommendation: The North Korean Crisis

Introduction and Background on the North Korean Crisis

In the face of the crisis with North Korea’s nuclear program and recent actions, including missile tests and increased North-South rhetoric, the United States must choose a smart foreign policy strategy to address the situation. However, the available options are complicated. Among the choices presented below, deepening the existing United States’ alliance with Japan and facing the crisis through a collective, non-aggressive, but firm positioning is the best course of action. Such a strategy could potentially include South Korea as well to create a multilateral approach.

North Korea and its nuclear aspirations have been an ongoing challenge for the United States and South Korea since the 1950-53 Korean War. It should also be noted that North Korea poses a complicated problem. It plays a significant role in regional stability, is a known supplier of missiles to the Middle East and Iran, and has relationships with terrorists and terrorism (Dobson 2006, 202-203). In recent weeks, Pyongyang has heightened its rhetoric in response to sanctions imposed by the United Nations to deter North Korea from conducting further nuclear tests. Instead, the sanctions prompted North Korea to escalate the situation with threats to launch preemptive nuclear strikes on the United States and others deemed “enemies.” While North Korea may have current limitations to its nuclear program, “it is growing at an unknown rate,” and its “operational blueprint for how it might employ nuclear weapons” poses a significant threat (Narang 2015, 82). It is the response to these threats and the current crisis that this brief will address. Below are current domestic and international level constraints to examine, followed by three possible courses for consideration and the reasons and logic behind the final recommendation.

Domestic and International Level Constraints

Before jumping into the possible responses, it is essential first to grasp existing domestic and international level constraints. The United States must devise a plan of action that adheres to the policies, capacities, and interests of its state and those of the international community and the state(s) with which it works (Adnan 2014, 663). How well the United States understands and adheres to domestic and international level constraints will directly impact how successful any foreign policy strategy, including a response to the North Korean crisis, will be.

Two significant domestic level constraints that deserve attention here are national morale / public opinion and political parties. A strong national unity is essential in the face of whatever response is chosen regarding North Korea. That unity can be directly influenced by both public opinion and political parties. It is crucial to consider the underlying values of our social system and determine if these values “promote a united national effort” for the chosen foreign policy toward North Korea (Adnan 2014, 666). Further, public opinion can influence political parties and elections, and while the masses might not always be interested in the details of foreign policy, any manipulation can backfire. Therefore, it is important to consider where democrats, republicans, and the public stand on the issue and find some common ground.

On the international level, it is important to consider the constraints in place from international bodies such as the United Nations and those constraints faced internally by other involved states, such as differences in policy, military capabilities, or their state’s public opinion. For example, it would be wise to consider that North Korea feels a need to show off its military strength to its people and maintain a certain level of “national dignity and sovereignty” (Nakato 2016, 638) in the face of what to them might feel like hostile forces fighting against their objectives.

Evaluation of Possible Response Options

One potential response is to deepen U.S. relations with China as a means to address North Korean nuclear concerns. China has historically served as a protector and advocate for Pyongyang, and China might serve as a useful resource to curb North Korea's nuclear stockpile to limited means (Narang 2015, 74). As long as Pyongyang sees China as a patron, negotiating power between them remains possible. However, if this relationship were to dissolve, North Korea is likely to shift its nuclear strategy to an "aggressive first-use posture," as a deterrent against the "nuclear superiority of the United States and South Korea" (Narang 2015, 74). Therefore, it is in the interest of the United States to work with China toward mutually beneficial North Korean foreign policy strategies and encourage China's continued relationship with Pyongyang. 

China has adopted assured retaliation positioning in conjunction with a "no-first-use policy," meaning that North Korea is not likely to feel overly threatened nor want to cross them (Narang 2015, 78), so China could be used as a voice of reason. There would be substantial challenges to this approach, however. China doesn't want American influence and power to grow in the Korean Peninsula nor Asia more broadly. Such concerns have heightened with the strengthening relationship between the United States and Japan. China views North Korea "as a useful communist buffer" amidst growing American influence by way of South Korea (Dobson 2006, 204). However, they have also become wary of North Korea's nuclear ambitions. It would, therefore, be wise to tread carefully when navigating such a strategy through China.

Another potential option is to open direct lines of communication and negotiation with North Korea. By first understanding and empathizing with the 'why' behind North Korea's nuclear ambitions, a path of negotiations and consensus on alternative options might be possible. North Korea's nuclear testing is a direct result of perceived hostility or "hostile policy" toward North Korea on the part of the United States (Nakato 2016, 621). De-escalation and a cooling down of rhetoric and hostilities in the wake of a long history of distrust might open up communication lines. It's also vital to remember North Korea's domestic factors that play a part in the flexing of its nuclear muscles. If talks and possible negotiation become viable options, this could open up the possibilities of peace talks with South Korea.

Finally, taking full advantage of all possible joint efforts with the United States' ally, Japan, is another potential option. Japan has adopted a "broad catalytic nuclear posture" (Narang 2015, 77), meaning they might be more willing to partner with the United States on a strategy to contain Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal. Japan's policy toward North Korea has shifted from one described as "strategic, cautious, and opportunistic" in nature to one of engagement (Nakato 2013, 51). Japan's policy maintains specific objectives of relevance: it does not seek to overthrow the North Korean regime, but rather, it hopes to deter perilous behaviors and encourage "peaceful coexistence with the Korean Peninsula" (Nakato 2013, 51-51). 

These objectives might well prove to be the right tone for the United States and Japan to proceed jointly, or multilaterally with South Korea to open up negotiations with Pyongyang to curb their nuclear ambitions and reduce the perceived hostility. Further, the United States could assist Japan with its concern about medium-range ballistic missiles by upping its military defense. At the same time, Japan could help with the United States' concern about intercontinental ballistic missiles. Continued economic sanctions against North Korea could also prove helpful; however, care must be taken not to create a similar escalation as the United Nations imposed sanctions.

Recommendation and Conclusions

While all three potential options hold some element of value and potential for success, they must be weighed carefully. Deeping the United States' relationship with China poses a moderate risk because China is deeply resistant to any increased power balance in the region in favor of the United States. This will make working together on such an important issue as North Korea a challenge. It could also pose a problem for the United States if public opinion and political party opposition surfaced around relations with China. Additionally, any direct communication between the United States and Pyongyang would be shadowed in mutual distrust. It would prove challenging to sort out what is genuine from what is not in negotiations. Direct negotiations might further be frowned upon by North Korea if domestically, public opinion sees it as a weakness. However, the existing relationship between the United States and its ally, Japan, has the potential to be strengthened in such a way that is mutually beneficial and opens doors for South Korea. 

Because Japan embraces a more catalytic nuclear positioning, diplomatic assistance, and U.S. military muscle would likely be welcomed (Narang 2015, 75) in the face of current North Korean escalation and enhanced ambitions. More broadly, Japan itself is less equipped in the face of the deepening nuclear crisis to sustain second-strike capabilities (Narang 2015, 76-77). If the United States can add its military muscle to the mix, it would give Japan an added level of comfort and deepen the United States – Japanese alliance. 

As previously mentioned, Japan has existing objectives in the case of North Korea, which do not pursue regime overthrow strategies (Nakato 2013, 51). This is a smart positioning for the United States because any hint at forced regime change would deepen North Korea's mistrust and hamper negotiations or compromise efforts. By sharing such objectives with Japan that don't include overthrowing Kim Jong-un, the United States and Japan could more collectively work together to devise less aggressive strategies that reduce perceived hostilities, oppress alarming behavior coming out of North Korea, and promote Japan's pursuit of "peaceful coexistence with the North Korean Peninsula" (Nakato 2013, 52). Nakata highlights that not only does Japan hope to help facilitate a more peaceful regional coexistence through non-military means, but it also hopes to restructure the very "nature of North Korea's political and economic system" (2013, 52). The United States could partner with Japan to impose additional sanctions that might influence North Korea to step up to the negotiating table. But care must be taken because it could also produce the opposite response, as seen with the sanctions imposed by the United Nations. A more multilateral approach would be to include South Korea in the mix and come at the situation from a stronger collective advantage. 

Regardless of the specific strategic details that would come later after joint discussions, a strong partnership with Japan amid the North Korean crisis offers several advantages. A collective and less aggressive approach could yield better results, while still protecting Japan should the crisis take a turn for the worse. This is a plus for the United States and a plus for Japan. Overall, strengthening the existing alliance with Japan is a significantly less risky choice for the United States than trying to develop fruitful relations with China or navigating the waters of mistrust through direct approaches with North Korea.

In conclusion, the crisis with North Korea is dire. If not adequately addressed, it could even exacerbate the regional nuclear dynamic by provoking others to reevaluate their own nuclear ambitions and strategic positioning (Dobson 2006, 202). O'Hanlon and Bust (2018) pointed out military options to avoid: blocking ports, attacking nuclear infrastructure, shooting down missiles, or putting a target directly on Kim Jong-un. Because more aggressive means are not advised, it underscores how vital a collective effort in alliance with Japan is to address the crisis from a softer, yet non-the-less firm, approach. 

References:

Adnan, Mubeen. 2014. "Foreign Policy and Domestic Constraints: A Conceptual Account." South Asian Studies 29, no. 2: 657-675, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1640460058?accountid=8289.

Dobson, Alan P. and Steve Marsh. 2006. The western hemisphere and Asia in the post-Cold War world. London and New York: Routledge. US Foreign Policy Since 1945, Chapter 12, Introduction and sections on Asia.

Nakato, Sachio. 2013. "Japan’s Responses to the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Responsive Engagement Perspectives."The Journal of East Asian Affairs 27, no. 1: 47-0_8, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1442762512?accountid=8289.

Nakato, Sachio. 2016. "North Korea's Fourth Nuclear Test: System Pressures, Decision Makers' Perceptions, and Foreign Policy." Korea Observer 47, no. 3: 621-649, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/1882464627?accountid=8289.

Narang, Vipin. 2015. “Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers: North Korea and Iran.” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 1 (February 2015): 73–91. doi:10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038175.

O’Hanlon, Richard C. Bush and Michael E. 2018. “Navigating Options on North Korea.” Brookings (blog). January 22, 2018. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/01/22/navigating-options-on-north-korea/.

#NorthKorea #writing #writer