Democracy, Islamism, and a Post-Arab Spring Middle East

Part 1: 

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia when a fruit merchant lit himself on fire in protest of government corruption and widespread poverty. It sparked a chain reaction across much of the Middle East, where disenchanted citizens fed up with the authoritarian rule, corruption, and a lack of opportunity, took to the streets. The spread of protests across the region has had three important impacts on Middle East security and political development: 1) It allowed for possible democratic reform and the potential spread of liberal democracy in the Middle East; 2) It created an opportunity for Islamic parties, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to embrace heightened strategies toward economic growth and development; and 3) It opened doors for radical Islam and theocratic strategies to step in and spread among the chaos. 

Many experts have highlighted that the Arab Spring may change the political foundation in the Middle East to one more conducive to the spread of liberal democracy. The idea is that when the masses protest and bring about the fall of their authoritarian leader, a new leader elected by and for the people can be put into power. Constitutions and checks and balances can be created that provide the necessary structures for a successful democracy. One of the crucial differences in the Middle East from Western liberal democracy is the role and influence that Islam plays in the region. 

Would a democratic Middle East create a separation between government and Islam, or would it incorporate shari’a law? Charles Kurzman and Naqvi Ijlal highlighted that historically, Islamic parties have fared worse in freer elections than they do in less free ones (2010, 56). Most post-Arab Spring Middle East countries were under authoritarian rule that worked to suppress Islamic parties. As Kurzman and Ijlal detail, the “suppression of Islamic electoral options only makes them more popular with voters” (Kurzman and Ijlal 2010, 61). Yet, “when Muslims are given the opportunity to vote freely for Islamic parties, they have tended not to do so” (Kurzman and Ijlal 2010, 61). But this gives Islamic parties a chance and creates a foundation conducive to the potential for democracy in the region after authoritarian powers are stripped of their positions.

However, the Arab Spring created an interesting change in Egypt for the long-suppressed Muslim Brotherhood to step into power (temporarily) after the fall of Mubarak. It also opened a window for the Salafi movement to step into the political arena. However, Nathan Brown explained that “Unlike Salafi movements, which pride themselves on their unswerving dedication to religious texts,” the Muslim Brotherhood utilized social engagement as a strategy to encourage citizens to improve themselves and society through Islamic teachings (Brown 2012, 7). Once in power, they hoped to set themselves apart from previous autocratic government corruption as an alternative that allowed opposition parties and created a more transparent and defined government. The Brotherhood hoped to also improve economic stability in the post-Arab Spring Egypt through honesty and by harnessing “citizen’s abilities, skills, and pockets of wealth in a manner allowing for healthy economic development” (Brown 2012, 15). The Muslim Brotherhood hoped to create something more representative and democratic in Egypt.

Others have cast doubts and insist that Islamist extremism and sectarian divide might step in amongst the chaos to fill the void that the uprisings created, as seen in Syria and Bahrain. Fareed Zakaria explained that although historically the Middle East region consisted of mostly corrupt and heavy-handed autocratic leaders, they are “still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them” (2004, 2). He went on to highlight a high likelihood that elections would put into positions of power politicians who espouse views similar to Osama bin Laden (Zakaria 2004, 2). Zakaria pointed out that “In Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, on virtually every political issue, the monarchs are more liberal than the societies over which they reign” (2004, 2). Youth across much of the Middle East are joining forces with militant religious groups, including Hamas and Islamic Jihadis. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Islamic parties with a distaste for democracy could use elections as a means to step into power, only to then structure theocracies that keep them in control (Zakaria 2004, 2). What initially resembles democracy could be turned into a “one man, one vote, one time” strategy (Zakaria 2004, 2). 

The Arab Spring created the potential for both opportunity and danger across the Middle East. It created a chance for the root and spread of democracy, for the involvement of Islamic parties to become more involve and less suppressed, and it also opened the door for more extremism and sectarian divide. The only thing that seems certain is that the future of the Middle East is largely unknown.

Part 2: 

A revivalist movement is on the rise in the Middle East that doesn’t appear to be going away anytime soon. Islamism seeks a return to the old days and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Further, there are three primary streams of thought within the broader umbrella described as Islamism: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis. While all Islamists center their beliefs on a shared religious dogma, there are marked differences across the three streams of thought, and they are likely to affect any attempts toward a democratic transition in the Middle East. 

Islamism bases its religious dogma on a worldview consistent with tawhid, meaning the oneness of God, and “ardent rejection of a role for human reason, logic, and desire” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 207).  They aspire to strictly follow the examples set by the Prophet Muhammad and deduce that by doing so, “they eliminate the biases of human subjectivity and self-interest, thereby allowing them to identify the singular truth of God’s commands” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 207). However, the modern-day Middle East and broader global arena pose new challenges with no neatly defined solutions handed down by the Prophet Muhammad. This has created marked disagreement around how to address modern challenges and who is best equipped to do so. It has birthed the three primary divisions of thought within Islamism.

As Quintan Wiktorowicz highlighted, the struggle between the three streams of thought is largely generational (2006, 217). The purists fall somewhat on the ‘old school’ end of the spectrum. They are typically elderly and cling to the old ways of staying away from the political arena, which is thought to be “a diversion that encourages deviancy” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208). Instead, they insist that modern challenges be met by non-violent means. Further, they encourage education and the study of Islam to find answers to problems in the contemporary world.

The politicos, on the other hand, are of a younger generation than the purists and approach the subject of politics in a different light. They are more politically minded in general and have “a better grasp of the complexities of contemporary politics and international affairs as well as intellectual autonomy” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 217). They believe this better equips them to interpret modern challenges and make more informed decisions than their purist counterparts (Wiktorowicz 2006, 217). Yet, the purists insist that “religious training” and “credentials” make them better suited, and they declare that an “emphasis on politics and current affairs threatens to erode the purity of Islam by introducing temporal human emotions and desires” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 217).

The Jihadis, also primarily made up of the younger generation, take a militant stand and insist that the use of violence is both necessary and, in many cases, called for to establish an Islamic state (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208). Militant jihadi beliefs were born during the Afghanistan/Soviet Union war. The conflict served as a “dangerous incubator” when it exposed the radical ideologies of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Jihad, and others to Islamists “in a context of military training and warfare” (Wiktorowicz 2006, 225). Because their political exposure and training came on the battlefield, it was colored by politics and violence (Wiktorowicz 2006, 225).

The rise of Islamism in the Middle East is likely to impact the potential spread of democracy in the region. Mona El-Ghobashy highlighted the “desire of radical Islamist groups in Egypt to morph into legal political parties partaking of the electoral game” (2005, 391). Further, within Islamism, two of the three primary streams of thought desire some form of political participation. The divisions within Islamism are largely generational in structure, and the only one that lacks the passion for political involvement is the purists––the most elderly of them all. It is the youth of the Middle East who will largely sculpt the future of the region.

References:

Brown, Nathan J. 2012. “When Victory Becomes and Option: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Confronts Success.” Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/brotherhood_success.pdf

El-Ghobashy, Mona. 2005. “The Metamorphosis of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 37.3: 373-395. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy1.apus.edu/stable/3880106

Kurzman, Charles and Ijlal Naqvi. 2010. “Do Muslims Vote Islamic?” Journal of Democracy 21.2: 50-63 http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/195557470?accountid=8289

Wiktorowicz, Quintan. 2006. “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29.3: 207-239. 

Zakaria, Fareed. 2004. “Islam, Democracy, and Constitutional Liberalism.” Political Science Quarterly 119.1: 1-20.

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