The Potential Impact of Democratic Peace in the Case of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

INTRODUCTION:

Many experts have argued in international relations that liberal democracy brings a pacifying effect to the regions where it takes root. In this context, it’s believed by many experts that an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict could come through the successful spread of democracy in the Middle East. However, there are also experts in the opposite camp who believe the dispute will only resolve through a stable deterrent that prevents renewed warfare between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 

Given these circumstances, I'll first discuss the democratic peace theory to provide a basic foundation for why democracy might create peace in the first place. Then I will discuss the democracy deficit as it relates to the Middle East and why the region has historically struggled with the adoption of democracy. Next, I will provide some arguments in support of a successful transition to democracy and peace in the Middle East as well as against its success. Finally, I will argue the accuracy of the democratic peace theory applied to a democratic one-state solution as a viable strategy for consideration to end the current Arab-Israeli conflict and two-state stalemate.

DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY:

The general principle behind the democratic peace theory is that democracies are more resistant to engaging in armed conflict with other democracies. Having shared democratic beliefs, therefore, lends itself to more peaceful resolutions and outcomes when disagreements do surface. This also creates an environment where aggressiveness or violence between one democracy and another democracy is not generally feared, and as Nincic described, it makes "preemptive attacks unnecessary" (1994, 1047). In contrast, the same peaceful scenario does not tend to play out between democracies and autocracies. 

The nature of democracies means they must maintain public support and agreement across governmental branches where autocracies lack such restraints (Nincic 1994, 1047). This makes going to war less likely in democratic states, wherein autocratic states, war, and aggression may more easily come at the whims of the ruling power, regardless of how the public, who lacks any control or say in the matter, feels. John Owen described a liberal democratic structure as one indebted to institutions "that give citizens leverage over governmental decisions" (1994, 124). Even when leaders push against their will, the existence of regular free and fair elections paired with free speech, the power of the people can force "illiberal leaders of democracies to follow liberal ideology" (Owen 1994, 124). The need for public support inherent in democratic structure creates a more trusting environment between one democracy and another. This underlying trust means that typically, there is no real reason for one democracy to create conflict with another.

If the theory that democracies are more peaceful and less prone to conflict is indeed accurate, could democracy help bring peace to the Middle East, and more specifically, the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict? Islamic fundamentalists outright reject the very individualism required for democratic structure and harmony to take hold (Owen 1994, 125). Additionally, as Azar Gat points out, democracy is difficult to successfully cultivate in both underdeveloped and developing countries because modernization, both social and economic, has yet to be realized (2005, 73). Even if a state were to become democratic before it has successfully developed modern social and economic foundations, it would likely not be successful in creating democratic peace (Gat 2005, 73). If Israel and the Palestinians successfully came to a two-state agreement, both with democratic structures, would they still side against war, given all the previous conflicts and a lack of Palestinian social and economic development?

DEMOCRACY DEFICIT IN MENA:

Given the Palestinian state apparatus, is a democratic two-state scenario even an option? The state apparatus is generally quite useful in securing positions of power and is one reason for the democracy deficit prevalent across the Middle East. The existing fabric throughout the Middle East is primarily built upon authoritarian and monarchial structures. The region has a history of resistance toward the adoption of democratic structures and ideals. These authoritarians often retain their power through the use of successful coercive apparatuses, which in many cases, are funded through the rentier effect. 

Eva Bellin argues that "When the military can no longer pay the salaries of its recruits and the security forces cannot guarantee supplies of arms and ammunition, the coercive apparatus disintegrates from within" (2004, 144). Oil, and more specifically, the rentier effect, works against democratic transition (Ross 2001, 337). This is because the rentier effect from oil generates income for authoritarian regimes to fund their coercive apparatuses and allows them to offer lower tax rates and government-funded programs that pacify opposition. However, oil is a finite resource, and the Arab Gulf states are making efforts to prepare and transition toward a life without oil, although with limited success. The shift away from oil could impact how prevalent democracy is in the Middle East in the future. A potentially more democratic Middle East would undoubtedly affect the Arab-Israeli dynamic as well. The Palestinian state apparatus is ruling over the population. Hammami and Tamari described an absent civil society, little governmental guidance, and a "crying silence" (Hammami and Tamari 2001, 6). But this could change. Additionally, Hamas is open to administrative reform, ending corruption, and is more concerned with the immediate needs of the Palestinians. So, there is still room for hope.

FOR DEMOCRACY SUCCESS IN MIDDLE EAST:

Polarization is a phenomenon that can significantly impact democracy's success, and lessons emerge in areas of the Middle East that have already experimented with democratization. Eva Bellin highlighted Tunisia and pointed to the need to "reconceptualize our notion of what constitutes "fatal polarization" for democracy" (Bellin 2018, 471). Polarization can be referred to as ideological differences that fall on opposing ends of the spectrum, and it can be detrimental if it creates an uncertain environment for bargaining or compromise (Bellin 2018, 471). This is significant when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict as polarization is well ingrained, ideological differences abound between Israel and the Palestinians, and compromise has thus far been unattainable toward a two-state solution. But would their polarization prove fatal? 

Some experts argue that the problems polarization creates are not indeed tied to the distance between the ideological differences, but instead, it comes down to "intransigence and urgency" (Bellin 2018, 471). It can then be argued that if "ideologically conflicting political actors are willing to embrace longer time horizons to achieve their policy objectives, then democracy‐saving compromise can be achieved" (Bellin 2018, 471). Such was the case in the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America when shifting focus to long-term goals helped bridge the gap between conflicting sides (Bellin 2018, 471-472). Something similar might prove helpful in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the Middle East, much of the ideological differences are more cultural, such as Islamist versus non-Islamist or Palestinian-Arab and Muslim versus non-Arab Israeli Jew. But Bellin explained that even in the case of the Middle East, "the level of ideological distance between key parties need not spell democratic breakdown" when longer-term goals and strategies are embraced by political actors (Bellin 2018, 471-472). She points to Tunisia and Egypt as comparative examples where the distance between Islamist and non-Islamist ideologies was greater in Tunisia. Yet, Islamist leaders in Tunisia successfully pursued a policy agenda based on gradual change and longer-term strategies, which made the Islamist positions "less threatening" to the opposition and kept the forward momentum (Bellin 2018, 472). Strategizing toward the long term can create a more stable foundation and prevent democratic disintegration in deeply polarized states. 

In addition, Etel Solingen looked at militarized conflicts in the Middle East compared to East Asia and argued that the Middle East was more crisis-prone as a result of regimes with large military-industrial complexes (2007, 774). By contrast, East Asia focused on a more contained military, foreign investments, and predictability (Solingen 2007, 774). This could be applied to democracy and peace in the Middle East as potentially successful if there are strategy shifts and longer-term focus. If Middle East states can restructure their goals and include more foreign investments and stability, the possibility for democratic peace and a thriving regional transition might be possible. However, not all experts are so optimistic. 

AGAINST DEMOCRACY SUCCESS IN MIDDLE EAST:

There is an opposing camp to the belief that democratic regimes create a pacifying effect on internal conflict. This opposite camp, based on the "anocratic war" thesis, asserts that the nationalism inherent in democratic systems breeds civil strife rather than pacify it (Abulof and Goldman 2015, 73). Abulof and Goldman researched the two opposing theses applied to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and concluded that democracy in the MENA would not be as calming as other experts suggest (2015, 73). They argued that in the MENA region specifically, democracy and nationalism would create a foundation more conducive to the onset of civil war as well as increase the number of such incidents in a way that would likely breed "violent intrastate strife" (Abulof and Goldman 2015, 73). In contrast, anocracies tend to be less predisposed to internal conflict through the use of their coercive apparatus. 

One way to move past an increased risk for civil war in MENA democratic structures might be to turn toward a more long-term prerequisite for democratic peace, namely through "democratizing nationalism" to remove the nationalism barrier, one that often promotes internal conflict in such settings (Abulof and Goldman 2015, 73). Also, Abulof and Goldman advise, "complementing current research on intrastate and interstate clashes with the study of intercommunal conflicts and the democratic features of non-state polities" (2015, 73). Regarding subjects of peace and democracy in the setting of the Middle East, a lot can be said about Israel. 

Often touted as the lone Middle East democracy, Israel is frequently supported against authoritarian adversaries for its democratic ideals (Waxman 2016, 360). Speaking to Israel and democracy, the Jewish state has seen its fair share of failures but can broadly be described as successful. However, when it comes to democracy birthing peace, that's another story. Israel includes about a twenty percent Arab-Palestinian minority population (Waxman 2016, 360). The tension between Israelis and Arab-Palestinians, both inside and outside its borders, indicates that a pacifying effect has not yet taken root. Israel may be a democracy but the conflict with Palestinians may not necessarily be resolved if a two-state agreement is reached that leads to a democratic Palestinian state. Further, significant effort and strategy have been employed to reach an agreement to no avail. Perhaps considering alternative approaches such as the bi-national or one-state solution should be more seriously visited.

An echoing theme across both camps is turning toward longer-term strategies for the success of democratic peace in the MENA. In the camp that believes democracy to have a pacifying effect, this means long-term plans to avail fatal polarization. In the camp that thinks democracy will lead to internal conflict and civil war, this means applying long-term strategies around nationalism to reduce possible friction. 

IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE WITHIN THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT?

I argue that democratic peace theory is accurate if long-term views and strategies are employed. While there are significant challenges to a democratic peace in the Middle East and, more specifically, in the Arab-Israeli conflict setting, taking a long-term strategy to avoid fatal polarization between the Arab-Palestinian camp and the Jewish-Israeli camp has a fair chance at success. However, thus far, efforts to reach a two-state solution has largely led to stagnation, increased conflict, and stalemate with no compromise in sight. Therefore, I suggest visiting the bi-national or one-state solution as a realistic approach to the conflict. But would a one-state solution lead to civil war between the Israeli and Palestinian groups?

The concept of a one-state solution is picking up momentum in recent years as an alternative solution with promising potential. Samah Jabr described the Lausanne Conference, where a One Democratic State solution in Palestine/Israel was promoted (Jabr 2004, 23-24). The conference included intellectuals, academics, and activists of Palestinian and Israeli backgrounds where "Participants clarified that what was proposed is not the "anti-religious" secularism practiced elsewhere, but rather a pluralistic religious coexistence within a broader umbrella of separation between the particularities of the various religious groups and the laws of the State" (Jabr 2004, 23-24). 

While challenges certainly exist, the conference held to two primary goals: 1) support for the end of Palestinian land being occupied by Israel, and 2) the promotion of the one-state concept as a viable option across communities of both Israeli and Palestinian groups (Jabr 2004, 23-24). In a one-state setting, polarization would prove to be a challenging obstacle. However, fatal polarization in the quest for democratic peace could be avoided if political actors take a long-term approach to lessen the distance between the divide and offer more gradual change. 

Also, a civil war in a one democratic state solution could be averted through long-term strategies to democratize nationalism. Klein made an excellent observation concerning an Arab-Israeli conflict: "Any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will likely lead to an armed revolt against the legitimate government, or even a civil war of some dimension" but went on to highlight that a revolt might be avoided if opposing sides "find a way to cope with their extremists" in such a way that stifles conflict before it escalates into civil war (2019, 74). The Tunisia experience previously mentioned is an excellent example.

Further, in a transition away from Arab-Israeli conflict to a more stable democratic peace, Benjamin Miller argues that unstable conflict-ridden regions are largely impacted by global factors (2001, 199). He goes on to detail that great powers can have an influence on a "cold peace" if they cooperatively approach war-prone areas, but that great powers can exacerbate the turmoil if they make their approach in a more competitive manner (Miller 2001, 199). In this way, global powers might encourage a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict through a one-state solution based on cooperative strategies rather than dominating ones. The region has historically been forced against their will by British and French outsiders, and any plan which attempts to force their hand in this or that way will surely be met with resistance. In addition, "Great-power hegemony or concert can also increase the likelihood of a transition to warm peace in stable regions, especially if they are populated democracies" (Miller 2001, 199). If a bi-national democratic state solution to the Arab-Israeli dilemma were to be reached with the assistance of cooperative great powers, perhaps it would be met with a more peaceful future for the region. 

Democracy might also be better equipped to take root, survive, and spread in the MENA region as a whole if certain educational adjustments were considered. Equal access to education for all children of both sexes and in both urban and rural areas with an emphasis on specialized occupation training programs (especially in clean energy technology) would have a positive impact on democracies' potential in the region. Combine that with strong non-governmental, civil society promotion and democracy might stand a chance in the MENA region and have a positive impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

References:

Abulof, Uriel and Ogen Goldman. 2015. "The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East." International Journal of Conflict and Violence 9, no. 1: 73-89, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1788010658?accountid=8289.

Bellin, Eva. 2018. “The Puzzle of Democratic Divergence in the Arab World: Theory Confronts Experience in Egypt and Tunisia.” Political Science Quarterly (Wiley-Blackwell) 133 (3): 435–74. doi:10.1002/polq.12803.

Bellin, Eva. 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57. doi:10.2307/4150140.

Gat, Azar. 2005. "The Democratic Peace Theory Reframed: The Impact of Modernity." World Politics 58, no. 1 (2005): 73-100. www.jstor.org/stable/40060125.

Hammami, Rema and Salim Tamari. 2001. “The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning.” Journal of Palestine Studies 30.2:5-25. 

Jabr, Samah. 2004. "Lausanne Conference Considers One Democratic State in Palestine/Israel." The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 09, 23-24. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/218775796?accountid=8289.

Klein, Menachem. 2019. "Acknowledging the (Violent) Elephant in the Room."Palestine - Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture 24, no. 1: 74-79, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/2231400334?accountid=8289.

Miller, Benjamin. 2001. "The Global Sources of Regional Transitions from War to Peace." Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (2001): 199-225. www.jstor.org/stable/425495.

Nincic, Miroslav. 1994. The American Political Science Review 88, no. 4 (1994): 1046-047. doi:10.2307/2082785.

Owen, John M. 1994. "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace." International Security 19, no. 2 (1994): 87-125. doi:10.2307/2539197.

Ross, Michael L. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-61. www.jstor.org/stable/25054153.

Solingen, Etel. 2007. “Pax Asiatica Versus Bella Levantina: The Foundations of War and Peace in East Asia and the Middle East.” American Political Science Review101, no. 4 (November 2007): 757–780.

Waxman, Dov. 2016. "Is Israeli Democracy in Danger?" Current History, 12, 360-362. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/1847548178?accountid=8289.

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