Democracy Deficit and Renewed Sectarian Divide in the Middle East

Part 1:

An increased democratic presence in the Middle East is one of the critical elements that many policymakers believe would draw more stability and security to the region. Unfortunately, the Middle East has historically been plagued by what is coined as a "democracy deficit". In democratic countries, this term refers to low voter turnout due to disenchanted citizens who have lost trust in their government and eroding public confidence in democratic institutions. In the Middle East, it refers to a lack of democracy in the region and a noted difficulty for its ideals to take root. Such democratic structures have historically not taken root in the Middle East due to Ottoman rule and post-WWI European occupation. Post Ottoman Empire, the British and French carved up much of the region to suit their own needs, and building democratic institutions was not on the agenda. However, the modern-day Middle East continues to be resistant to democratic government for three crucial reasons: 1) The use of coercive apparatuses by authoritarian regimes; 2) Oil wealth and the rentier effect discourage non-governmental civil societies and political participation outside of the government, and 3) The suppression of women's rights and equality within tribal communities and Islam.

Authoritarian rule impedes democracy through its use of a coercive apparatus (Bellin 2004, 143). The coercive apparatus often consists of security forces and military who are able and willing to crush any resistance that may arise. A great example of this can be seen in both Khamenei's Iran and in Assad's Syria, where both Khamenei and Assad have used extreme measures through their coercive apparatus to crush resistance. This apparatus serves as a safety net to authoritarian rule and works to cement positions of power. However, Bellin highlights that "When the military can no longer pay the salaries of its recruits and the security forces cannot guarantee supplies of arms and ammunition, the coercive apparatus disintegrates from within" (2004, 144). The power inherent in this safety net underscores that the coercive apparatus of authoritarian regimes is one of the key impediments to democracy.

One of the reasons that several authoritarian regimes can gain funding for their coercive apparatus is due to oil wealth. Oil wealth leads to the rentier effect, whereby the government makes an enormous profit from outside its borders without the need to develop the state within. It allows the regime to offer low tax rates and pacify resistance through the creation of a variety of government-funded programs. Pro-government military and security forces can quickly crush any opposition that does rise. In this way, Michael Ross argues that oil wealth impedes any shift toward democracy due to this rentier effect (2001, 337). He highlights that oil wealth can "lead to greater spending on patronage, which in turn dampens latent pressures for democratization" (Ross 2001, 333). A shift away from oil and toward clean energy initiatives that create occupational training programs could potentially curb the rentier effect in the future. When citizens are involved in more income-generating efforts, they have a stronger impact on the actions of the government. 

Women account for about half of the population and play an essential role in both democratic and societal potential. Where women are suppressed, the wellbeing of society suffers, and democracy can be more challenging to achieve. In the Arab world, gender roles and expectations are significantly more patriarchal. But contrary to the belief of many, patriarchy in the Middle East did not begin with Islam. Its roots come from pre-Islamic tribal culture, not from Islam or the Quran. In its infancy, Islam improved the conditions for women in society and created more inclusive laws compared to what was in place at the time. But in many areas and tribal communities present-day, the promotion of women's inclusion and empowerment has been lost or falls on deaf ears. When half the population is subjugated, democracy will struggle to take root. Shifting the cultural paradigm will be a necessary strategy to improve the foundation for a democratic Middle East. Steven Fish argued that "Segregation of the sexes in the school, the workplace, and places of leisure creates a fundamentally different setting for social relations and for authority relations among males than does integration" (2002, 30). Creating co-ed structures across society would encourage inclusive thinking and increase access to education for women and girls. Additionally, context consideration concerning messages in the Quran would be impactful in changing false stereotypes and misinterpretations as it relates to women's roles in society. 

In conclusion, much of the democracy deficit seemingly inherent in the Middle East can be attributed to a variety of factors. While certainly not an exhaustive list, the coercive apparatus of authoritarian regimes, oil wealth and its resulting rentier effect, and the patriarchal nature of society all contribute to foundations not conducive to democratic root in the Middle East. However, each of these roadblocks can be addressed through a variety of strategies and initiatives in the future.

Part 2:

The Sunni-Shi'a divide has been at the root of substantial conflict across the Middle East ever since the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632. With no clear guidelines left behind on who should succeed him and lead the Muslim world, the Sunni-Shi'a divide was born. In more recent history, renewed tensions between the two sects have arisen in the wake of some significant shifts in the power balance across the Middle East. Geneive Abdo highlighted that "the marginalization of the Shi'a in the public and economic spheres provoked political discontent at a time of great change in the Middle East" (Abdo 2013, 28). The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the Arab Spring all worked to reshape the power balance, turning the tides for a more pronounced Shi'a regional presence, events that renewed tensions between the Sunni and the Shi'a. 

The inflamed Sunni-Shi'a tensions and power struggle have impacted regional stability and security in the Middle East in three important ways: 1) An emboldened Shi'a theocracy in Iran hopes to expand its influence past its borders and across the Middle East; 2) There is significantly increased violence and extremism across the region, much of which is playing out in present-day Syria; and 3) The shift in the Middle East power balance and renewed sectarian struggles call for a change in U.S. strategies and foreign policy. 

The 1979 Iranian Revolution not only ousted the shah, but it dramatically altered the balance of power and Shi'a influence in the region. It also meant Iran had become "the first state controlled by the Shi'ite clergy," as well as "the first Islamist state, that is committed to the implementation of political Islam" (Abdo 2013, 32). Ever since the 1979 revolution, an emboldened Iranian theocracy has strategically moved to expand its influence beyond its borders in the hopes of leading a pan-Islamic world and cementing its power within it. Among other strategies, Iran has coordinated coups attempts and financially backed radical groups that suit Iran's interests beyond its borders. A specific example can be seen in Iran's belief that Bahrain is their "rightful territory," and it is believed that the 1981 and 1996 coup attempts to remove the Bahraini government were coordinated in Tehran (Abdo 2013, 16). Also, the Iranian regime has "looked for windows of opportunity to embrace Sunni populations" in the wake of the Arab Spring and major conflict (Abdo 2013, 48). Further, Iran's strategy is not to achieve regional hegemony alone, but also to better its position on the global stage and create leverage among world powers (Abdo 2013, 52). The U.S. invasion in Iraq and the removal of its Sunni minority leader, Saddam Hussein, certainly impacted Iran's strategy in new ways.

Violence and extremism have intensified across the Middle East throughout the renewed sectarian divide. The Arab Spring brought to the forefront new conflicts and political strategies that are likely to continue to reshape the Muslim world. The Syrian war has intensified, and Syria has become a battleground where much of the Sunni-Shia conflict is playing out. And the actions in Syria are not contained to its borders as Abdo explains, "Each new turn in Syria, whether facts on the ground or merely perceptions of new threats and new alignments that may emerge, reverberates throughout the Levant and the Persian Gulf" (2013, 2). Sectarian conflict and violence are no longer contained in the borders of this country or that country. It has become a transnational conflict, and Syria is the place where many players throughout the Middle East are fighting it out. Unfortunately, with all the human rights abuses and atrocities taking place in the conflict, many are becoming more radicalized on a stage that encourages, and in many cases, requires violence. When peaceful action is met with extreme violence, and there are no mechanisms for protection, attitudes shift. 

With a renewed sectarian divide and shifting power balance across the Middle East, new U.S. foreign policy strategies are called for to accommodate the changing arena. Also, changes much be made to meet Iran's strategies to subdue power across Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States through religious and political influence. The United States should start paying more attention to the religious dynamic across the Middle East than it has in the past, as it relates to foreign policy. Abdo detailed that the United States has largely ignored the role of religion in Middle East politics for decades––this has to change (2013, 59). Secular state actors are disappearing, and a post-Arab Spring Middle East has emerged. This is a Middle East where "religion and the affiliated phenomenon of sectarianism are now emerging as powerful mobilizing forces in the region and as potent sources of regional instability and conflict" (Abdo 2013, 59). A greater understanding of Islam and the sectarian divide on the part of the United States, as well as its inclusion in foreign policy decisions, are a must. 

In conclusion, renewed Sunni-Shi'a tensions and shifts in the power balance across the Middle East are leading to new political interests. Militant extremists have entered the fight for power, and foreign policy will need to be reshaped to accommodate the changing Middle East. Juan Cole described the renewed tensions well when he said, "The old sectarian balance in the eastern Arab world, with Sunni rulers and Shiite ruled, is coming unraveled as Shiite masses are mobilized into new forms of sectarian politics" (Cole 2006, 25). When the U.S. invaded Iraq, new Sunni fears were born to include those of the Shi'a tipping existing power balances in their favor (Abdo 2013, 42). One thing is for sure––the region is in the midst of historical change, and the world is watching.

References:

Abdo, Geneive. 2013. The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a-Sunni Divide, Washington DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/sunni-shia-abdo.pdf

Bellin, Eva. 2004. "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective." Comparative Politics 36, no. 2 (2004): 139-57. doi:10.2307/4150140.

Cole, Juan. 2006. "A "Shiite Crescent"? The Regional Impact of the Iraq War."Current History, 01, 20-26. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/200761710?accountid=8289.

 Fish, M. Steven. 2002. "Islam and Authoritarianism." World Politics 55, no. 1 (2002): 4-37. www.jstor.org/stable/25054208.

Ross, Michael L. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-61. www.jstor.org/stable/25054153.

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