The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Root Causes and Pivotal Moments

Root Causes of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 

The Arab-Israeli conflict present today has a deep and complicated history. Too often, the general public is exposed to information largely biased and in favor of one side or the other, depending on various factors, and, therefore, develops their own opinions from incomplete information. In the United States, information regarding the conflict is generally presented in favor of Israel, given the two states' history. That means the average American is less likely to have a firm grasp on the Arab/Palestinian side of the equation. The conflict was largely born from two overarching issues that came to a head and became intertwined together at just the right time: the growing Zionist movement and the creation of Israel as a state and national homeland. However, it's the details underneath these themes where the roots of the conflict predominantly reside. Specifically, the League of Nations Mandate controversy and the Holocaust both weighed heavily in the birth of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Had either been missing from the equation, the conflict we know today would likely look very different or cease to exist. 

 Much of the present animosity between the Israelis and the Palestinians dates back to broken promises, mismanaged alliances, and poorly worded agreements. The controversy over the League of Nations Mandate and agreements between British Henry McMahon and Arab leaders Hussein bin Ali and his son, Faisal, are largely to blame for laying the foundations for the Arab-Israeli conflict more broadly. The points of contention arose from an agreement made between McMahon and Hussein resembling a proposed partnership. Essentially, McMahon promised to secure an independent Arab state within Arab lands under Ottoman rule, putting Hussein in a power position, in exchange for Hussein mobilizing warriors and successfully leading a revolt against the Ottomans. But then the agreement gets muddy.

Hussein appointed his son Faisal as the leader of the promised revolt. But the rebellion didn't go as promised, leaving the Arabs short of their end of the bargain. Friedman underscored this shortfall, saying "between the original expectations, on which the deal [with] the British and Hussein was based, and the actual performance, there was a considerable gap" (1970, 103). Yet, in the end, the Ottomans were defeated, and the land was carved up. But Hussein was left on the losing end of misinformation and what some argue, outright lies.

The largest source of argument surrounded Palestine, and who promised what to who and with what intent. Britain claimed control over Palestine and later promised it to the Jews to serve as a national homeland, which helped secure additional alliances. Britain's actions angered the Arabs, who insisted that they had been promised Palestine. Thus, the debate was born, and the official agreements and correspondences were scrutinized. 

Much of the scrutiny involved the intentions behind specific wording on McMahon's part and how those words translated into Arabic and were received by Hussein, Faisal, and the Arabs. McMahon insisted that he intentionally excluded Palestine as part of the agreement and promised Arab land, and upon scrutiny of correspondences, Friedman argued the same (1970, 108). Yet, Toynbee saw it from another point of view and claimed there was inconclusive evidence of the specific exclusion of Palestine within the agreement (1972, 188-189). Regardless of the truth behind the debate, the wheels of motion were set for conflict. 

Yet, the League of Nations Mandate controversy wasn't all there was to the Arab-Israeli conflict's root causes. Without the Holocaust and the Zionist revolution, Palestine wouldn't have been sought out by the Jews with the urgency, determination, and vigor that it was. Taylor pointed out that "The major factors in the success of the Zionist revolution were the incidence of systematic anti-Semitism on an appalling scale under the Hitler regime and the Zionist facility for organization and propaganda" (1972, 46). He underscored the unprecedented conversion to Zionism ideals, sparking increased loyalties, and the desire to create a Jewish state (1972, 46). That aside, the more significant roots of the conflict seem to have arisen in the details. Had Palestine been given to the Arabs, or had a Jewish national homeland not been promised as it was, the region and parties involved would undoubtedly have a different history and present day. Had correspondence between these players been more clearly written and agreements made with less room for questioning and scrutinization, the region, again, would likely look very different.

The Three Most Pivotal Moments of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 

There have been a lot of significant moments throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict. Three of the more pivotal moments were the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Six-Day War, and the Camp David Accords of 1978. Each of these has further sculpted and defined the conflict in unique ways. However, an overarching theme has emerged across all three: Arab/Palestinian loss and suppression. It seems that since the very beginning, the Palestinians, in particular, have suffered at the losing end of the matter.

As the Holocaust raged on and Hitler murdered Jews by the millions, more and more Jews looked to Palestine as the place to build community and home. Yet, while the suffering of the Jews was genuine and very raw, the Arabs certainly didn't appreciate being forced from their homeland to make way for the creation of a Jewish state. Tensions continued to rise, and while partition plans were discussed, the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 carved its place in history. Worse still for the Palestinians, they came into the conflict with more than their fair share of disadvantages. While the Israelis prepared their armed forces to battle a full-on Palestinian army, the Palestinians were, in reality, very ill-equipped, unorganized, and unprepared (Tal 2000, 4). As Tal described, "Riven by internal conflicts and in discord with the Arab governments, they were no match for the highly motivated, well organized and motivated Jews" (2000, 4). In the end, they were defeated.

The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 and the subsequent Palestinian defeat marked a significant change in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Palestinian defeat drove hundreds of thousands (by some accounts around 700,000) of Palestinians out of their homes, off their land, and into refugee camps in neighboring Arab states (Hirsch 2007, 242-243). And although the Palestinian refugees shared much in common with their Arab neighbors, these states failed to accept and integrate them into society. That alienation and loss led to hurt, anger, poverty, and a general lack of opportunity for the Palestinian refugees. From that environment, a collectiveness and bond grew. As a result, a new Palestinian national movement and "nationalist awakening" was born (Shemesh 2004, 90). These significant shifts fueled the Palestinian desire to take back their land and return home. That narrative was passed on from one generation to the next and is very much ingrained in Palestinians' hearts and minds today.

The conflict continued to grow more complicated. From Israel's perspective, the "enemy" was all around them, heightening the fear of Arab annihilation. As Dayan described, "The country's main roads and railways are exposed" and "Scarcely anywhere in Israel can a man live or work beyond the easy range of enemy fire" (Dayan 1955, 250). And while neither side wanted to engage in another war, particularly Israel, in the absence of Western protection, Egypt's Nasser had growing ambitions to lead the Arab world and show off his political muscle. 

Egypt positioned themselves in the Saini peninsula, and while there are debates surrounding Nasser's true intent behind the move, from strategy related to Syria to a fear of Israeli nuclear bombs, Gat highlighted that "Aronson concludes that Nasser's decision to send forces into the Sinai was designed from the very beginning to bring about a military confrontation" and that Nasser's actions were "premeditated" (2005, 609-610). And bring on a war it did. When Egypt blocked Israeli shipping passage through the Straits of Tiran, it crossed Israel's red line, and another war, the Six-Day War, ensued. This time with the United States' sympathies was on Israel's side (Gat 2005, 624). And while Nasser had the advantage of a united Arab strength in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the war didn't end as Nasser or the broader Arab world had planned. 

Israel won the Six-Day War and conquered the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights (Segev 2006, 145). Such a quick and successful Israeli win marked a pivotal moment in history as it significantly boosted Israeli confidence. From that renewed spirit, a newer form of Zionism began to take root among younger Israelis. Not only did the Six-Day War, as Segev described, energize many "Israelis into taking up the Zionist mantle once again and making a fresh beginning in the newly captured land" (2006, 145), but it also left them in control of Gaza, the Golan, and the West Bank. 

The Camp David Accords of 1978 were another important moment in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Anwar Sadat, Menachem Begin, and Jimmy Carter were the primary creators of the accords. But in the end, the agreements largely favored the Israelis and left a lack of progress on the Palestinian question (Quandt 1986, 358). In addition, the accords allowed Israel to serve its own interests and goals, including retaining questionable settlements and taking advantage of loopholes to further expand its settlements to the detriment of Palestinians (Sayegh 2006, 18). And while some lip service was paid to Palestinian representation, in reality, the accords left the Palestinians voiceless and at Israel's mercy. As Sayegh described, any Palestinian proposals must be first submitted and approved by the Arab delegation, and then by the Israelis (2006, 7-8), essentially leaving them without a say in their futures. Further, the accords stipulated that only Palestinians displaced IN 1967 could return, and Israel retained the legal right to turn away any returning Palestinian for "security" reasons (Sayegh 2006, 19). Not only did the Camp David Accords leave the Palestinians largely without representation or voice, but it also denied many the right to return home.

Some celebrate the Camp David Accords as a successful turning point between Israeli-Egyptian relations in the wake of the Six-Day War. Still, the accords also put salt in the Palestinians' wounds as they excluded a Palestinian solution and broader "comprehensive settlement" (Quandt 1986, 357). The Camp David Accords marked progress between Egypt and Israel, but served a painful blow to the Palestinians, and ultimately deepened the divide.

References: 

Dayan, Moshe. 1955. “Israel’s Border and Security Problems.” Foreign Affairs 33.2: 250-267

Friedman, Isaiah. 1970. "The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence and the Question of Palestine." Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 2 (1970): 83-122. Accessed December 7, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/259746.

Gat, Moshe. 2005. “Nasser and the Six Day War, 5 June 1967: A premeditated Strategy or an inexorable Drift to War?” Israel Affairs 11.4: 608-635.

Hirsch, Michal Ben-Josef. 2007. "From Taboo to the Negotiable: The Israeli New Historians and the Changing Representation of the Palestinian Refugee Problem." Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 2 (2007): 241-58. Accessed December 11, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20446422.

Quandt, William B. 1986. “Camp David and Peacemaking in the Middle East.” Political Science Quarterly 101.3: 357-377.

Sayegh, Fayez. 1979. “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem.” Journal of Palestine Studies 8.2: 3-40.

Segev, Tom. 2006. “A Bitter Prize.” Foreign Affairs 85.3: 145-150. 

Shemesh, Moshe. 2004 “The Palestinian Society in the Wake of the 1948 War: From Social Fragmentation to Consolidation.” Israel Studies 9, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 86–100. doi:10.2979/ISR.2004.9.1.86.

Tal, David. 2000. “The Forgotten War: Jewish--Palestinian Strife in Mandatory Palestine, December 1947--May 1948.” Israel Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3/4, Spring/Summer2000 2000, p. 3. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1080/13537120008719569.

Taylor, Alan R. 1972. "Zionism and Jewish History." Journal of Palestine Studies 1, no. 2 (1972): 35-51. Accessed December 7, 2020. doi:10.2307/2535953.

Toynbee, Arnold, and Isaiah Friedman. 1970. "The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence: Comments and a Reply." Journal of Contemporary History 5, no. 4 (1970): 185-201. Accessed December 7, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/259872.

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