The Impact of the United States on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Introduction:

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been an ongoing and often misunderstood conflict since the events of the Holocaust and the hope of the Jewish peoples to return to their ancestral homeland. On the flip side, such aspirations pushed out Arab-Palestinians from their homes and created immense suffering and a substantial refugee problem. The conflict between the two sides became heated, violent, and ongoing. A variety of outside actors have gotten involved throughout the conflict's history. This paper aims to analyze the impact that the United States has had on the conflict and assess whether that impact has been more positive or negative in nature. 

The paper is structured in the following way: First, a background is provided to lay the groundwork for the conflict. Next, the involvement and biases of significant U.S. administrations are discussed, including those of the Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, Regan, Bush (George H.), Clinton, Bush (George W.), and the Trump administrations. It then provides an analysis of the United States' involvement and biases. It argues that overall, the United States' involvement has had a negative impact on the conflict because it has been considerably biased toward Israel. Therefore, it has created an unfair foundation from the Arab-Palestinian perspective and hindered opportunities to find peaceful compromise and resolution.

Background:

The Arab-Israeli conflict emerged as a result of a growing Zionist movement, the Holocaust, and the creation of Israel as a state and national homeland for the Jewish people. Much debate and miscommunication arose surrounding land, misrepresented promises, an Israeli settlement on Arab soil, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem––and the Arab-Palestinians were largely left on the losing end. Grievances ultimately led to the Arab-Israeli War of 1948, the Six-Day War, the Camp David Accords of 1978, an Israeli invasion of Lebanon, growing Palestinian frustration, an Intifada, and the Oslo Accords. During the course of events, outside players of influence have included Great Britain, the United States, the European Union, the Soviet Union and Russia, the United Nations, Lebanon, and other groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. 

Yet, after all the influences and attempts at peaceful resolution, after a rollercoaster of ups and downs in negotiations, the conflict remains unresolved and fluid, everchanging. Part of the lack of a solution revolves around the conflict's complexities. But part of it can also be attributed to biased influences from the outside, and the unsteady ground from which attempted solutions were proposed. It seems that historically, negotiations have never been conducted, nor solutions presented, from a genuinely neutral ground where both sides are equally understood, respected, and represented. 

The United States’ Involvement:

Since the birth of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States has involved itself in various ways to find a resolution between the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the Arabs more broadly. Such attempts have been made with the understanding that success requires considerable concessions from both sides. However, as Yaqub underscored, U.S. administrations have done so with an uneven hand and have “steadily revised its prescriptions for a settlement to bring them more in line with Israeli preferences” (2006, 13). Such strategies can be understood given the high level of Israeli support ingrained in American politics and Israel’s considerable military arsenal, but how can a truly fair and successful resolution be built on unequal ground?

Certainly, the United States has indeed at times successfully exerted sizeable pressure on Israel to come to the negotiating table and make considerable concessions. Examples include the withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, the peace agreement with Egypt, opening up communication lines at the Madrid Peace Conference, and others (Wilcox 2016, 483). But the U.S. has not applied consistent pressure; it’s remained largely silent in the face of expanding Israeli settlements and has resorted to complaining more than penalizing Israel for its wrongdoings and shortcomings (Wilcox 2016, 483). Such actions have left Israel with many gray areas to move around in concerning outside pressure and its Palestinian strategies. It has also served U.S. interests. Fernandez highlights that Palestine is strategically located at the “crossroads between the Middle East and Northern Africa” and serves as a valuable piece of land to the United States who has, since the Cold War, sought a strategic advantage to the oil-rich regions of the Middle East (2005, 42). But what about the Palestinians who suffer the consequences?

Indeed, the call for Israeli support lives vivaciously in American politics, but the attitudes of the American public don’t fully align with that of the government or with its politics. Moughrabi describes public opinion surveys which convey an American populace who “sympathize” with Israel but also feel that the Palestinians are entitled to their own state, are against economic or military aid above that offered to other states, and oppose “military intervention on the side of Israel even if it is invaded by the Arab countries” (1988, 135-136). That is certainly not in harmony with the U.S. government’s near unconditional support of Israel, even in the face of human rights atrocities. Yet, Moughrabi points out that any criticisms against Israel could come at the cost of anti-Semitism cries and accusations (1988, 136). But is pushing the Palestinian people from their homes, taking their land, and refusing to truly hear their grievances so different from what so many Israelis came to Palestine to escape? Are they not, to some degree, committing some of the same painful acts on the Palestinians that anti-Semites committed on them?

Since the early days of the conflict in 1948, the United States has mostly ignored Palestinian refugee cries for their right to return and has instead taken a position more aligned with resettlement in neighboring Arab countries (Mustafa and El-faith 2016, 72). But Palestinian refugees are significantly underserved and treated as outcasts by their Arab neighbors. The United States has historically turned a blind eye to the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, refused to exert pressure for withdrawal, and outright rejected plans which called for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Mustafa and El-faith 2016, 72-73). The constant favoring of Israel by the United States has not provided the fertile ground necessary to resolve the conflict in a manner that both sides can appreciate.

Such favoring of Israel has been a recurrent theme across multiple U.S. administrations. The Truman administration is but one example. President Harry S. Truman was a key player involved in sculpting Israel’s creation. Yaqub highlights Truman’s support of the U.N. partition plan and his recognition of the creation of the Jewish state (2006, 14). Truman may have been concerned for the humanitarian aspect of the Holocaust, but he failed to pressure Israel by any considerable means regarding its occupation of Palestinian land and the scores of refugees its actions created (Yaqub 2006, 14). Further, Fernandez underscores that Truman’s recognition of Israel “provoked the ire” of neighboring Arab states, who then accused the United States of “perpetuating the systematic dispossession of Palestinians of their lands” (2005, 42). As more and more Jews immigrated following the Holocaust, more and more Palestinians were displaced. 

The Eisenhower administration’s actions in 1956 highlight the rare example of the United States exerting significant pressure on Israel and taking a hard stance that Israel didn’t like. President Dwight D. Eisenhower cut off aid to Israel during the 1956 Suez Crisis while simultaneously demanding its withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula (Fernandez 2005, 43). However, such pressure didn’t last long. When the Six-Day War broke out in 1967, Israel conquered the Arabs and took the Sinai Peninsula, as well as the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank. The turn of events caused the United States to reevaluate its position and increase aid to Israel in an attempt to counter Soviet support provided to Arab states (Fernandez 2005, 43). The renewed support of Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War marks a turning point where, as Fernandez describes, any effort to reevaluate the “unconditional support of the Jewish state of Israel” largely disappeared (2005, 43). Unfortunately, the Palestinians have continued to suffer as a consequence.

The biased-toward-Israel nature of U.S. involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued. The Johnson administration advocated for a “cease-fire-in-place” that resulted in the “indefinite” occupation of Palestinian territories captured by Israel (Yaqub 2005, 14). The Nixon administration put on a false-front and publicly called for Israel to withdraw from occupied territory while at the same time privately ensuring Israel that implementation wouldn’t be enforced (Yaqub 2005, 14). The Carter administration brokered the Camp David Accords that significantly benefited Israel. The accords allowed Israel to serve its interests and goals, retain questionable settlements, and take advantage of loopholes to further expand its settlements to the detriment of Palestinians (Sayegh 2006, 18). The Camp David Accords brought Israel successes, but it did the opposite for the other half of the equation, the Palestinians. While some lip service was paid to Palestinian representation, in reality, the accords left the Palestinians voiceless and at the mercy of Israel. 

The Regan administration did successfully hold discourse with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), but it was later suspended by Regan’s successor, George H. W. Bush (Yaqub 2006, 15). Christison highlighted that the Bush Administration’s strategy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict largely resembled that presented in a policy paper by the pro-Israel aligned think tank, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. She underscored a “diplomatic management” approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because it wasn’t “ripe for solution” (Christison 1990, 115). The Bush administration may have “showed a noticeable coolness toward Israel” compared to the U.S. support of Israel in the past (Christison 1994, 41). Still, the Palestinian perspective was markedly absent from the administration’s considerations.

The Clinton administration referred to East Jerusalem not as “occupied” territory but instead as “disputed” territory (Fernandez 2005, 45). If the very start of the conflict taught anyone anything, it should have been that words choices matter. Using the term “disputed” not only underscored an underlying bias toward Israel, but it also opened a window and strengthened Israel’s resolve to deny Jerusalem to the Palestinians (Fernandez 2005, 45). Additionally, post-Oslo Accords, President Bill Clinton outright rejected refugee rights present in Resolution 194, thereby reducing the Palestinian cause and depleting it of legal avenues for the return of refugees (Fernandez 2005, 45). Such slights to the Palestinian cause continued throughout his presidency.

President George W. Bush approached the conflict in the early days of his presidency with a lack of interest (Mustafa and El-fatih 2016, 74). But in the wake of the September 11th attacks and the new War on Terror, when the armed struggle of the Palestinian cause became a point of concern, the Bush administration changed its tune (Mustafa and El-fatih 2016, 74). Bush did offer the Palestinians a glimmer of hope when his administration proposed that 85 percent of Israeli-occupied land be returned to the Palestinians (Fernandez 2005, 46). But during negotiations, he pulled the U.S. out of the peace process entirely, which left the Palestinians on their own in an unfair balance with Israel (Fernandez 2005, 47). The Palestinians had accepted the U.S. as a mediator in the face of a long history of biased U.S. pro-Israel actions. But once again, they were left with an unfair disadvantage and not treated as equals in the process. More recently, the Trump administration publicly recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, an outright slap in the Palestinians' face.

Analysis:

Looking back across a wide variety of administrations, it seems clear that whether or not the United States has had a positive or negative impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict largely depends on the lens and context from which it is being analyzed. One consistent theme has emerged: an overarching bias toward Israel. From an Israeli perspective, the United States is more likely to be seen as having had a positive impact on the conflict. In contrast, the Palestinians have overwhelmingly been ignored, taken advantage of, or left on the losing end in most aspects of the conflict's history involving the United States, with a few exceptions. Obviously, then, from the Palestinian perspective, U.S. involvement has had a negative impact on the conflict overall because it's failed to treat the Palestinian cause with the same respect as it has treated the Israeli one. 

I argue that from an outside perspective, the United States' involvement has had a negative impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout its history. How can one expect both parties to come to the negotiating table when that table leans toward one side? Mohamad rightly underscored that "The unequal balance of power between Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, the continuation of Israel's military occupation of the Palestinian territories and the U.S.'s continued backing of Israel were, and remain, among the prime factors that have led to the collapse of almost all available peace plans intended to resolve the conflict" (2007, 85).  By not providing equal opportunity, respect, understanding, and consideration to both sides, how can success be achieved? 

Even in "successful" accords, one side (the Palestinians) were not provided their fair share of opportunity nor chance to find a peaceful resolution they could live with. Therefore, I also argue that the United States has had a negative impact on the conflict from all perspectives (except for perhaps, its own) because, due to its biased nature, it has not provided a fertile foundation conducive to actual resolution. In that way, even from the Israeli perspective, U.S. involvement could be viewed negatively because of the very significant fact that it is still ongoing. Had the U.S. stepped into the mix more fairly, peace might have already been achieved. Further still, U.S. involvement in the conflict could even be viewed negatively through its own lens because its biased nature toward Israel has created a credibility problem for itself in the Palestinians' eyes and, more broadly, the Middle East. When trust erodes and anger intensifies, the United States could find itself as a target for which such disenchantment and anger are hurled.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, the Arab-Israeli conflict involves two historically mistreated and abused peoples seeking refuge and "home" on the same land. While the Israeli Jews have suffered greatly, their efforts to return to their ancestral home have simultaneously and devastatingly pushed out the Palestinian people from theirs. Further, the Israelis have committed some of the same painful acts against the Palestinians that were perpetrated on them by anti-Semites. The United States, for its part in the conflict, has primarily acted to serve its own self-interest rather than acting as a genuine mediator seeking a right and fair resolution. Its self-interests have included an overarching biased leaning in favor of Israel, to the detriment of the Palestinians and the broader Arab world. Such actions have eroded Arab trust in the United States and could pose a catalyst to Arab-Palestinian anger directed toward the United States. Regardless, the United States' actions have caused further pain and suffering to an already tormented people.

References:

Christison, Kathleen. 1990. "Policy Perspective and the Arab-Israeli Conflict." Journal of Palestine Studies 20, no. 1 (1990): 115-18. Accessed January 7, 2021. doi:10.2307/2537326.

Christison, Kathleen. 1994. “Splitting the Difference: The Palestinian-Israeli Policy of James Baker.” Journal of Palestine Studies 24/1: 39-50 

Fernandez, Erwin S. 2005. “The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: (Un)Forging Future Peace.” International Social Science Review 80 (1/2): 41–50. https://search-ebscohost-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=ip&db=aph&AN=17577554&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Mohamad, Husam A. 2007. "The Peace Process and the Palestinian Political Landscape*." Journal of International and Area Studies 14 (1) (06): 85-94. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/scholarly-journals/peace-process-palestinian-political-landscape/docview/223826546/se-2?accountid=8289.

Moughrabi, Fouad. 1988”. The U.S.-Israel Relationship." Journal of Palestine Studies 17, no. 4 (1988): 134-38. Accessed January 7, 2021. doi:10.2307/2537301.

Mustafa, Eid H., and El-fatih A. Abdelsalam. 2016. “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: Palestinian Officials’ Perspective on the George W. Bush Administration’s Intervention.” Mediterranean Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 2016): 72–87. doi:10.1215/10474552-3697843.

Sayegh, Fayez. 1979. “The Camp David Agreement and the Palestine Problem.” Journal of Palestine Studies 8.2: 3-40.

Wilcox, Philip C., Jr. 2016. "America, Israel, and Missed Opportunities for Peace." The Middle East Journal 70 (3) (Summer): 481-485. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/scholarly-journals/america-israel-missed-opportunities-peace/docview/1806389517/se-2?accountid=8289.

Yaqub, Salim. 2006. "The United States and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947 to the Present." Magazine of History 20 (3) (05): 13-17. https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/scholarly-journals/united-states-arab-israeli-conflict-1947-present/docview/213731060/se-2?accountid=8289.

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