The Afghanistan Conflict and Foreign Policy Instruments

Introduction and Background

The war in Afghanistan has been ongoing since 2001. It remains a critical piece of the puzzle in U.S. foreign policy, and it’s of paramount importance in combating terrorist groups bent on causing harm to the United States. Arbour highlighted that a large part of the struggle in Afghanistan has been waning trust between the U.S. and Afghan leaders, establishing the framework for credible elections, and building a robust system to withstand Taliban efforts to exploit the law and sow divide (2012). Among the many foreign policy instruments the United States could embrace as a means to improve the crisis, foreign economic aid administered in a proscriptive manner holds promising potential for improving Afghanistan’s stability. It will not, however, be very beneficial as a stand-alone strategy.

It’s important to recognize that the war in Afghanistan has been active for a long time. Many foreign policy instruments have been implemented to improve the circumstances and “win” the war. However, the conflict is highly complex, and no strategy has served as a magic pill to end the conflict and birth a new Afghanistan sans terrorism. The reality is that it will likely take a multitude of foreign policy instruments and strategies and a growth mindset to make any real progress in the region. 

Combating modern-day terrorism is a new type of war, one not previously explored. The Afghanistan crisis requires new tactics, strategies, and mindsets. It will likely take many failures, reframes, and learning experiences before anyone gets it right. Further, the conflict itself and the terrorist networks at its heart are fluid and ever-changing. Strategies will need to be adapted in real-time to stand any chance of success. The longer the conflict rages on, the more the details will mutate. Strategy matters because getting it “wrong” is potentially very costly. As Arbour detailed, “At worst, it could result in the fragmentation of the security services and trigger extensive internal conflict” (2012). Such fragmentation would be bad news for both Afghanistan and the United States’ goals to combat terrorism. 

Foreign Policy Instrument Evaluations

The crisis in Afghanistan is complex, and there are a variety of potential tools available for consideration. Negotiations hold uncertain promises as trust between U.S. and Afghan officials wanes. Military force to fully dismantle remaining terrorist cells and keep new ones at bay faces a public weary of the long, drawn-out war, seemingly with no real end in sight, and calls for troops to come home have grown louder. Yet, full military withdrawal risks leaving a vacuum in its wake for terrorist cells to fill. However, two instruments of slightly softer and less intrusive natures hold middle ground potential in addressing the Afghanistan crisis. 

One instrument is foreign economic aid administered in a proscriptive manner. Between 2003-2010, Afghanistan saw an international investment of more than 67 billion dollars (Lynch 2015, 122). This investment opened up a significant opportunity for the state’s advancement and stability. Not only did such financial assistance and attention help to advance health care, education, opportunities for Afghan girls, and improved Afghanistan’s connection to the outside world, but it also “advanced Afghanistan’s capacity for self-governance,” including a military “manned, equipped, and somewhat trained for internal policing and limited counterinsurgency operations” (Lynch 2015, 122). While these are welcomed improvements, there is still a long way to go, and the risk of losing all that progress is real. 

Afghanistan is incredibly poor and critically dependent on foreign investment to overcome its challenges. Lynch highlighted that nearly 40 percent of its citizens fall within official poverty criteria, and the unemployment picture looks similar (2015, 122-123). Lack of education and opportunity are prime environments for the growth of extremist organizations. Militant groups come with the promise of power and stability for all who join the cause. Such tactics underscore why continued foreign investment in Afghanistan, particularly in youth education and trade schools, is essential. If Afghanistan’s children are brought up with a strong foundation for a bright future and young men and women are trained in areas that provide quality job opportunities, the recruitment efforts of terrorists will be less impactful. 

However, how any aid is administered and implemented is important. Karell and Schutte conducted a study that highlighted that careful consideration “must accompany the use of developmental aid as a policy instrument for reducing violence and insecurity during ongoing irregular conflicts” (2018, 722). Even the most well-intentioned aid, economic or otherwise, can actually exacerbate conflict if administered in a manner that creates or deepens the divide. It can also be flipped in a way that fuels terrorist recruiting efforts. Additionally, Bizhan echoed the importance of aid strategy by comparing state-building aid strategies across different states, namely South Korea, Taiwan, Iraq, and Afghanistan (2018, 1026). His conclusion underscored that strategy behind state-building aid “may reinforce or hinder state-building, depending on the recipient’s type of state, the state’s capacity and whether aid ensures continuity and supports state activities or creates a parallel, competing institutions to those of the state” (Bizhan 2018, 1026). However, if extreme care is taken in formulating how future foreign aid is administered in Afghanistan, it could have an incredibly positive impact on the crisis. While it is costly to invest in new rounds of foreign assistance, doing so could improve Afghanistan’s foundation and stability.

Continued foreign military aid applied in a proscriptive manner through Afghan police and military training initiatives is another possible instrument that carries potential success. Simón looked at U.S. retrenchment strategy in Afghanistan along with its potential consequences across the Middle East and found that such retreat might very well create a vacuum that “may further compound geopolitical contestation and instability across the Middle East” (2016, 139). However, such risk also doesn’t imply a necessity for a full military presence either. Instead, a middle ground U.S. military aid with the purpose of continued training and support of Afghan forces until they can retain stable conditions on their own is essential. 

A strong Afghan police force and army matter because without them, Afghanistan will continue to provide a fertile environment for terrorist groups to congregate, spread their ideas, and wreak havoc on U.S. interests. Lynch underscores that such terrorist organizations view Afghanistan through a mystical lens, a land supportive of Sharia law with a “porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border” from which they might “manage global jihad” (2015, 126). Afghan security has suffered setbacks from the first wave of U.S. withdrawal and its scaled-back presence in the region. Afghan police and military are still in their infancy compared to the task at hand. They are in great need of continued support and training if they are to retain control from terrorist organizations. 

Securing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), Afghan National Army (ANA), and Afghan National Police (ANP), remain at the forefront of protecting all that has been fought for and worked at since the beginning of the war. Lynch points out that leaving these forces undertrained opens the door for a substantial risk of fragmentation that would dramatically heighten the instability of the war and the region at large (Lynch 2015, 121-122). Such fragmentation would further fuel terrorist recruitment efforts and create a safe space for global terrorism––none of which promotes anything that the U.S. has worked toward throughout the years of war in Afghanistan. While the U.S. certainly cannot fix all that is wrong in Afghanistan, it can do its best to leave the region with more promise than it started with and help to build a foundation conducive to success, both in terms of U.S. interests as well as the interests of Afghanistan. While it is costly and risks exacerbation of a public already wary of the war, well-trained forces free from corruption and fragmentation are an important part of that. 

Recommendation and Conclusions

Realistically, the troubles in Afghanistan cannot be solved with one strategy or foreign policy instrument alone. Discussed in this paper are but two of many potentially impactful instruments, and of the two discussed, overlapping implementation of each would be most impactful. However, foreign aid for education and training is recommended over the increased training of Afghan forces. It builds the framework for a more prosperous future in terms of police stability and impact. In general, highly educated citizens with plenty of job security and opportunity are less likely to feel disenchanted with their life circumstances and join terrorist organizations, to begin with.

While such education and training programs require a level of stability and a safe environment to facilitate, Afghan forces have already received some U.S. training and support. But Afghanistan suffers from an enormous level of poverty and a lack of jobs. Addressing this can curb the feelings of desperation that often birth vulnerability and can sculpt extremist ideals. It is common for Afghans to “suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, and medical care” (Lynch 2015, 122-123), and addressing this through foreign aid could have a considerable impact. If foreign assistance can create jobs and educate citizens to fill them in areas like health care and construction, Afghanistan would be better. If foreign aid programs can make a young Afghan man choose to become an electrician rather than join a terrorist group, Afghanistan would be better. And if foreign aid gives hope to the citizens of Afghanistan in a manner that makes them grow in positive ways, the Afghan security forces would be better for it. 

So, while increased training of the ANSF, ANA, and ANP would undoubtedly help the crisis that continues to unfold in Afghanistan, preventative and proscriptive programs designed to offer hope and opportunity can assist in softer ways. Such programs don’t require the same level of risk and physical danger that U.S. troops on the ground, training Afghan forces, have. Further, it would likely garner less public backlash than would a more physical presence in the region. For these reasons, the instrument of foreign economic aid is recommended over continued training of Afghan forces. 

In conclusion, the Afghanistan conflict is a new type of conflict that requires new strategies and new ways of thinking. Many different foreign policy instruments hold varying degrees of promise, which could be implemented to make positive progress. One way of addressing the crisis is by taking steps at a more foundational level, namely, working to stop terrorism before it starts. This goal can be partially achieved by utilizing foreign economic aid in ways that improve the everyday lives of all Afghans through increased opportunity. Equal access to education and vocational training would help curb citizens’ feelings of dissatisfaction that often open the doors for terrorist organization recruiters who prey on disenchantment and hopelessness by offering a so-called better life. However, it is vital to understand that such foundation-level strategies should also be combined with other foreign policy instruments. The complexity at hand requires an elaborate plan to meet it. It is also likely that because this is a new kind of crisis, it will likely take a lot of experimentation and failures before finding a path that truly works. But with grit, determination, and multilateral energy, the door to success remains open.

References:

Arbour, Louise. 2012. 10 conflicts to watch in 2013. Foreign Policy. 27 December 2013. 

Bizhan, Nematullah. 2018. “Aid and State-Building, Part II: Afghanistan and Iraq.” Third World Quarterly 39 (5): 1014–31. doi:10.1080/01436597.2018.1447369.

Karell, Daniel, and Sebastian Schutte. 2018. “Aid, Exclusion, and the Local Dynamics of Insurgency in Afghanistan.” Journal of Peace Research 55, no. 6 (November 2018): 711–725.

Lynch, Thomas F. 2015. “After ISIS: Fully Reappraising U.S. Policy in Afghanistan.” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 119–144.

Simón, Luis. 2016. “Seapower and US Forward Presence in the Middle East: Retrenchment in Perspective.” Geopolitics 21, no. 1 (January 2, 2016): 115–147.

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